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Huawei v Sweden

Case summary

At a glance

Parties
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. (China) v. Kingdom of Sweden
Case no.
ICSID Case No. ARB/22/2
Forum and rules
ICSID Convention arbitration; ICSID Arbitration Rules in force as of 10 April 2006; place of proceeding Washington, D.C.; hearing held in London
Treaty
China–Sweden BIT
Tribunal
Prof. Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler (President), Prof. Jane Willems, Prof. Zachary Douglas KC
Sector
Telecommunications; 5G network equipment
Outcome
Pending. The published documents are procedural orders only; they record the hearing of 25 November to 5 December 2024 and set post-hearing briefs for 2025, but do not show an award.
Amount
The Claimant's quantum expert, Dr. Dippon, stated that the impact of Sweden's measures on the contracts with Swedish mobile network operators deprived Huawei of US$ 561.94 million. The total amount claimed is not stated in the published documents.

The dispute

Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd., a Chinese company, wholly owns Huawei Technologies Coöperatief U.A. (Netherlands), which wholly owns Huawei Technologies Sweden AB. Huawei Sweden supplied equipment and services to Swedish mobile network operators (Hi3G, Telia and Net4Mobility) under long-term frame contracts. Huawei claims that Sweden's measures, including the PTS Decision excluding Huawei from the 2.3 and 3.5 GHz bands in the 5G rollout, drove it out of the Swedish carrier network market. It relies on the expropriation and fair and equitable treatment protections of the China–Sweden BIT. Sweden argues that the BIT does not protect investments that Chinese investors hold indirectly, that Huawei held no rights in Sweden's 5G networks and lacked Chinese Government authorization for 5G investments, and that the exclusion was consistent with EU 5G security policy.

Key holdings

  1. Bifurcation denied. Sweden's objection that the BIT does not protect investments held indirectly by Chinese investors did not raise a serious issue for a preliminary phase. The BIT's plain text does not appear to limit protection to a particular investment structure, and Article 1(2) defines the investor, not the investment. Procedural Order No. 3, ¶¶ 37–42
  2. Sweden's second objection, that Huawei held no rights underlying its 5G claims, is intertwined with the merits and would not dispose of the whole case. Huawei's claims also cover 4G, 6G, 7G and fixed-line networks. The 2004 authorization by the Shenzhen Bureau seemingly covered 5G-related investments. Reserving further objections for later was neither abusive nor contrary to Arbitration Rule 41(1). Procedural Order No. 3, ¶¶ 36, 43–49
  3. Huawei breached § 15.2 of Procedural Order No. 1 by relying on the contracts with the mobile network operators in its Memorial without filing them. It was ordered to produce them unredacted, with their components and the 2020 Hi3G contract "awarded but not signed". Purchase orders and the personal data of natural persons were excepted. Procedural Order No. 4, ¶¶ 43, 52, 57, 75
  4. The confidentiality clauses in the contracts permit disclosure under an order of the Tribunal and give the operators no veto. Sweden's 39.5% shareholding in Telia did not justify keeping the redactions. That risk was addressed by limiting access to Arnold & Porter and requiring written non-disclosure undertakings from officials of the Office of the Chancellor of Justice. Procedural Order No. 4, ¶¶ 65–72
  5. Transparency regime. ICSID publishes the Award, decisions and procedural orders, subject to redaction of protected information. Written submissions, supporting documents and hearing transcripts and recordings stay confidential unless both Parties agree otherwise. Procedural Order No. 2, ¶ 11 and Annex 1
  6. Document production. Requests for specific security assessments classified within SÄPO or the Armed Forces were denied. Other claims of protection under Swedish or Chinese law go to a privilege log. The Tribunal held that its duty to ensure due process may prevail over conflicting domestic protective rules. Procedural Order No. 5, ¶¶ 20–25
  7. The European Commission was admitted as a non-disputing party, limited to a 20-page written submission on EU rules and policy on 5G network security. The Tribunal excluded the margin of appreciation under EU law as not dispositive under the BIT. It refused the Commission access to the record and attendance at the hearing, and held that the Commission could not act as an independent EU law expert. Procedural Order No. 6, ¶¶ 9–11, 24–30

Procedural history

  1. 7 January 2022Request for Arbitration filed.
  2. 8 June 2022Tribunal constituted.
  3. 27 July 2022Procedural Order No. 1 sets the procedural rules and timetable, following the first session of 14 July 2022.
  4. 26 September 2022Procedural Order No. 2 adopts the transparency and confidentiality rules.
  5. 13 March 2023The Tribunal denies Sweden's Request for Bifurcation of 13 February 2023. Reasons follow in Procedural Order No. 3 of 28 April 2023.
  6. 21 July 2023Procedural Order No. 4 gives reasons for the decision of 29 June 2023 ordering unredacted production of the mobile network operator contracts.
  7. 2 February 2024Procedural Order No. 5 decides the Parties' document production requests.
  8. 26 June 2024Procedural Order No. 6 admits the European Commission as a non-disputing party on a limited basis, on its application of 16 April 2024.
  9. 25 November – 5 December 2024Hearing at the International Arbitration Centre, London. Hearing rules were set in Procedural Order No. 7 of 26 October 2024.
  10. 11 December 2024Procedural Order No. 8 sets post-hearing briefs for 7 March and 9 May 2025 and costs submissions for 6 and 20 June 2025.

Tribunal, counsel and experts

Decided by
Experts
Christian Dippon (claimant)

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Keywords

Summary generated with AI from the published documents — refer to the award for the authoritative text.